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FEDERAL INJUNCTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY STATE TAX
Theoretically, in the absence of statute, injunctive relief against
an illegal or invalid tax is obtainable when the case can be shown
to lie clearly within one of the recognized branches of equity juris-
diction, 1 such as avoidance of multiplicity of suits,2 removal of cloud
on title,3 or prevention of irreparable injury.4 Actually, however,
for cogent reasons of public policy derived from a supposed neces-
sity for uninterrupted revenues, supported by restrictive legislation,
equitable relief against taxes, is in most jurisdictions, either limited
or denied.5
Thus, injunction against federal tax is practically eliminated by
Rev. Stat. 3224.6 In only the most "extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances" have the provisions of the section been held inappli-
cable,7 and in only one situation-distraint during the pendency of
an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals-is there any statutory recog-
nition of injunction.8
contracts with their customers. It may be suggested that payees, especially
merchants and credit organizations who receive a considerable number of
checks might likewise protect themselves by contracts with the debtors that
checks tendered in payment are taken subject to final receipt of cash or solvent
credits thereon.
'37 Cyc. 1258; 4 CoOLaY, TAXATIoN (4th ed. 1924), §1641; (1894), 22
L. R. A. 700. See Dowes v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 20 L. ed. 65 (1870). For
helpful notes on injunction as remedy for unlawful taxation see: (1924) 22
MICH. L. R. 594; (1910) 10 COL. L. REv. 564.
'Raymond v. Chicago Union T. Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L. ed.
78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757 (1907) ; Porto Rico Tax Appeals, 16 F. (2d) 545 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1926); Fairley v. Duluth, 150 Minn. 374, 185 N. W. 390, 32 A. L. R.
1258 (1924); (1870) 22 L. R. A. 703; COOLEY, s-upra note 1, §1642.
'Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224, 18 S. Ct. 98, 42 L. ed. 444 (1897) ;
Note (1891) 10 L. R. A. 293; COOLEY, supra note 1, §1643.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Asheville, 69 F. 359 (C. C., W. D., N. C., 1895);
Odlin v. Woodruff, 31 Fla. 160, 12 So. 227, 22 L. R. A. 699 (1893).
'4 POMEROY, EQuITY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1919), §§1779-81; 37 Cyc.
1257; (1928) 26 MICH. L. R. 922.6 Comp. Stat. 5947, 26 U. S. C. A. 154. Statute does not prevent injunction
against collection of a penalty. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 66 L. ed. 1061,
noted: (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 761. Stockholder may maintain suit to restrain a
corporation from voluntarily paying a tax. Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.,
240 U. S. 1, 60 L. ed. 493 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S.
103, 60 L. ed. 493 (1916).
'Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922); Dodge v. Brady, 240
U. S. 122, 60 L. ed. 560 (1916).
Illegality of the tax will not take a case out of the statute. Snyder v.
Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 27 L. ed. 801 (1883) ; Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 60
L. ed. 818 (1922). On the same day that it refused an injunction in Bailey v.
George, the court held in the Child Labor Cases, 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. ed. 818(1922), that the "tax" in question was a penalty and unconstitutional, and a
few days later it granted an injunction against the collection of a penalty l
Lipke v. Lederer, supra note 6.
' Sec. 272 (a) Rev. Act 1928; 26 U. S. C. A. 1048. Peerless Mills v. Rose,
28 F. (2nd) 661 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928). See: (1926) 26 COL. L. Rzv. 493,
NOTES
Many states, including North Carolina, by statute, permit tax
injunctions but limit this relief to cases involving an illegal or in-
valid tax.9 This does not mean, however, that the court will restrain
a tax simply because it is irregular, erroneous or excessive.10 An
illegality resulting from the violation of some fundamental law is
required.11 Thus, relief was granted when the tax was levied under
an unconstitutional statute, 12 when the tax was for an unlawful pnr-
pose, 18 and when the levy was vitiated by fraud.14
A systematic and intentional adoption of any principle of valu-
ation contrary to the constitutional requirements of equality and uni-
formity is dearly discriminatory and is a basis for injunction. 15
Hence, relief has been granted when there was undervaluation of
other taxable property in same class with complainant's ;16 where cor-
porate holdings were assessed at full value according to law while
valuation of non-corporate items were illegally fixed lower ;17 where
different classes of property were assessed at different percentages
' N. C. Code (1927) 858, 7979; Hunt v. Cooper, 194 N. C. 265, 267, 139 S. E.
446 (1927); Ry. v. Commissioners, 188 N. C. 265, 266, 124 S. E. 560 (1924).
PomEaoy, supra note 5, par. 1781, cases collected by states.
"Wilson v. Green, 135 N. C. 343, 47 S. E. 469 (1904); McDonald v.
Teague, 119 N. C. 604, 26 S. E. 158 (1896); City. Ry. Co. v. Beard, 293 F.
448 (S. D. Ohio, 1923); Sou. Ry. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 67 L. ed. 375
(1923); Fordson Coal Co. v. Moore, 31 F. (2nd) 606 (E. D. Ky. 1929);
Chicago etc. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 S. Ct. 55, 69 L. ed. 183 (1924).
' Tax assessed at higher rate than allowed by city charter may be enjoined.
Colquit etc. Co. v. Colquit, 146 Ga. 519, 91 S. E. 555 (1917). But tax is not
illegal because the sidewalks of the taxing municipality were not of width
prescribed by charter. Soniat v. White, 155 La. 290, 99 So. 223 (1924). 37
Cyc. 1259. 4
"Purnelle v. Page, 133 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 534 (1903), state tax on salary
of Federal Judge; Koonce v. Pierce Petroleum Corp., 3 S. W. (2d.) 9 (Ark.
1928), unauthorized franchise tax; Greene v. Louisville etc. Co., 244 U. S.
499, 61 L. ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917 E. 88 (1917).
"' Rigsbee v. Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886); Richardson v. Kildow, 218 N.
W. 429 (Neb. 1928), noted: (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 122; Kan. City Sou. Ry. v.
Hendricks, 150 La. 134, 90 So. 545 (1922).
'Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 239 U. S. 234, 36 Sup. Ct. 62, 60 L. ed.
243, L. R. A. 1916 C. 522 (1915); Raymond v. Traction Co., supra note 2;
COOLLY, supra note 1, §1645.
'Bohler v. Calloway, 267 U. S. 479, 45 S. Ct. 431, 69 L. ed. 746 (1925);
Gammil Lumber Co. v. Board, 274 Fed. 630 (S. D. Miss., 1921); Elgin v.
Hessen, 282 Fed. 281 (D. C. Tenn., 1921) ; Chicago etc. Ry. v. Eveland, 13 F.
(2nd) 442 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 98, 45 S.
Ct. 55, 57, 69 L. ed. 183 (1924).
"'Mayor et als. v. N. Y. Bay Ry. Co., 13 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926);
Bank of Ariz. v. Howe, 293 Fed. 600 (D. C. Ariz., 1923) ; Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352, 38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L. ed. 1155 (1918).
' Boonville Nat. Bank v. Schlotzhauer, 298 S. W. 732, 55 A. L. R. 489 (Mo.
1927); Magnolia Bank v. Bd. Supervisions, 111 Miss. 857, 72 So. 697, 55
A. L. R. 1365 (1916).
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of value, contrary to law ;18 and where complainant's property was
so exorbitantly valued as to amount to spoliation.19 However, there
must be clear and convincing proof of intentional and systematic
discrimination,2 0 and injunctive relief has been refused when the
assessment was due to error,2 ' or to mistakes of judgment.22
Many cases involving injunction against discriminatory taxes are
carried into the Federal Courts on the grounds of violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution. 28 Once
having obtained jurisdiction, the power of the United States courts
to grant equitable relief against an illegal state tax is limited only
by the provision of the Judicial Code24 concerning the adequacy of
the remedy on the law side of the court.25
It is interesting in this connection to note that two recent Fed-
eral cases, one from North Carolina 26 and one from Ohio27 appar-
ently reach opposite results. In each case the complainant alleged
that its own property had been assessed at, or above, its proper value
while the property of others had been systematically and intention-
ally assessed at less than actual value. In both states, injunction
against illegal tax is recognized by statute,28 and in each an action
at law may be brought for recovery of tax paid under protest.21
"
3Chi. etc. Ry. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 44 S. Ct. 431, 68 L. ed. 878
(1924) ; Mobile & 0. Ry. Co. v. Schnipper, 31 F. (2d) 587 (E. D., Ill., 1929) ;
Chi. M. & St. P. Ry. v. Kendall, 278 Fed. 298 (S. D. Iowa, 1921). But see
(1910) 3 COL. L. REV. 298.
"Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton, 240 Fed. 485 (D. C. Nevada,
1917) ; Sanford v. Roberts, 193 Ky. 377, 236 S. W. 571 (1922) ; City of Sweet-
water v. Baird Devel. Co., 203 S. W. 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'Taylor v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 350, 373 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) ; Louis-
ville Trust Co. V. Stone, 107 Fed. 305, 308 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901) ; Chi. Ry. Co.
v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 S. Ct. 55, 69 L. ed. 183 (1924). And as a
necessary condition precedent to equitable relief, the complainant must pay the
amount of the tax he would have to pay if the discrimination did not exist.
Raymond v. T. Co., supra note 2; PomEaoy, supra note 5, §1784.
' Siler v. Bd., 221 Ky. 100, 298 S. W. 189 (1927), noted: (1928) 16 Ky.
L. J. 275.
'Harrison v. Ry., 142 Ark. 118, 218 S. W. 208 (1920).
'See Powell, Due Process Tests of State Taxation (1926) 74 U. PA. L.
REv. 423, 573.
2§267, 28 U. S. C. A. 384.
'Federal Courts in the exercise of equity jurisdiction not bound by state
statute prohibiting tax injunction: Standard Oil Co. v. Howe, 257 Fed. 481
(C. C. A. 9th, 1919) ; Ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 188, 37 L. ed. 689 (1893).
'Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 32 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 4th,
1929).
Conn v. Ringer, 32 F. (2d.) 639 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
"North Carolina: N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §858; Ohio: Gen. Code
§12075.
" North Carolina: N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §7979; Ohio: Gen. Code
§12075.
NOTES
Held: in the North Carolina case, adequate remedy at law, no relief;
in the Ohio case, adequacy of the legal remedy doubtful, injunction
granted.
The two cases are, however, distinguishable along these lines:
(1) In the Ohio case, the complainants were trustees of a charitable
trust, the disruption of whose functions perhaps affected the public
interest sufficiently to counterbalance the state's interest in the cer-
tainty of collection of taxes; in the North Carolina case, the com-
plainant was a manufacturing company. (2) In the Ohio case, the
discrimination alleged was between real property assessments on the
one hand and those of personal property on the other, each class con-
cededly being treated uniformly within itself; in the North Carolina
case, the allegation was that as to the same class of property, com-
plainant was assessed at a figure in excess of its property's true
value, while the assessed value of others' was fixed at 60 per cent
of its true value. (3) In the Ohio case, the tax commission, at plain-
tiff's request alone, could not remedy the situation; in the North
Carolina case, a similar administrative agency had actually lowered
plaintiff's assessment somewhat. (4) The court in the Ohio case was
not concerned with the adequacy of a suit to recover taxes paid under
protest but with the efficacies of an untaken appeal to the tax com-
mission to cause personal property to share its burden of taxes so as
to prevent such burdensome taxes on realty; the court in the North
Carolina case was wholly concerned with the adequacy, under the
North Carolina statute, of a possible suit on the law side of the
Federal Court to recover taxes to be paid under protest.
Even so, the view of the Federal Court in North Carolina seems
unnecessarily restrictive. It felt that a Federal Court should be
cautious about enjoining the collection of a state tax. The Ohio
court expressed no such hesitancy, however, and, as the cases cited
in the note8 0 indicate, this caution has frequently yielded o the de-
mands of meritorious facts. Moreover, the Federal law court, if
and when it gets the case, will, if the allegations are found true, in-
terfere by its judgment to as great an extent with the fiscal oper-
ations of the state. Perhaps, however, although the case was con-
sidered on the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, the
"Accord: Cummings v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 25 L. ed' 903 (1879) ;
Western Union v. Tax Com, 21 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Dawson v.
Distilleries etc. Co., 255 U. S. 288, 65 L. ed. 638 (1920) ; Gammil Lumber Co.,
supra note 15; State Bd. v. Ry., 191 Ind. 282, 130 N. E. 691 (1921) ; Paxton
v. Ohio Fuel Co., 11 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
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court was unconsciously influenced by the fact that the District Court
had expressly found that no discrimination of the sort alleged actu-
ally existed.
If discrimination between the assessment of real and personal
property was enough in the Ohio case, is not the alleged discrimina-
tion between assessments of properties in the same class more de-
serving of equitable relief ?31 Moreover, the exception in the North
Carolina statute, in favor of injunctive relief against illegal taxes,
creates no greater right to that relief than exists in jurisdictions with-
out any such statute.32 The view that this statute, by virtue of that
exception, operates to increase the remedies available in the Federal
Equity Court and must therefore be ignored, is perhaps derived from
the court's willingness to make the same statute, insofar as it author-
izes suits to recover taxes paid under protest, the affirmative basis
of a proceeding on the law side of the same tribunal.
Finally, even if a recovery at law of the difference between the tax
on a legal assessment and the actual amount of the tax paid under
protest, with interest, will theoretically make the complainant whole,
and even if this decision would be res judicata: as to subsequent levies
pending the next quadrennial assessment (which might be doubted in
view of the technical change in the issues and subject matter from
year to year) the relief to be awarded at law can take no notice of
the jeopardizing of the complainant's financial structure incident to
the loss of those funds during the period of suit. A jury could not
deal intelligently with the issue to be presented at law; a judge sitting
alone will have to handle the task that a court consisting of three
judges in the instant case refused to attempt. It is not believed that
the remedy at lav is adequate.
The North Carolina case is now before the Supreme Court of the
United States on a writ of certiorari. THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.
TITLE TO CORPORATE PROPERTY UPON DISSOLUTION
Smith v. Dicks' presents a question as to property rights of stock-
holders where, without knowledge on the part of the corporate mem-
' See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tax. Com., stpra note 30.
" See notes 1 to 5 supra. The court examined the state supreme court's con-
struction of the statute and found it difficult to determine precisely when in-junction against illegal taxes would be granted. It assumed, however, that the
state court would have granted that relief in the case at bar. Herietta Mills
Co. v. Rutherford County, supra note 26, at p. 573.
± 197 N. C. 355, 148 S. E. 463 (1929).
